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Trading and Fat Tails
Sudden, large price changes periodically occur in speculative markets.  Many of these 
large price moves simply reflect the market’s reaction to new fundamental economic 
information-- as financial theory would predict.   However, some of the most extreme price 
moves—often characterized (albeit incorrectly) as “Black Swans” in popular parlance--reflect 
more the predictable behavior of traders in certain situations or poorly designed market 
microstructures than the arrival of new fundamental information. These trading-induced price 
moves have important implications for practitioners, policymakers and academics alike. 
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1. The Behavior of Speculative Prices
Most changes in speculative prices follow simple time 
series processes.  Indeed, empirical observations by Working 
(1934); Kendall (1953); and Roberts (1959) that changes in 
various speculative prices appeared to fluctuate randomly 
preceded the development of a theory to explain why 
they should (Samuelson, 1965).   The notion that changes 
in speculative prices respond only to the arrival of new 
information in an efficient capital market as Fama (1965) 
and Ross (1989) have argued remains a central tenet of 
modern financial theory.
The observation by Mandelbrot (1963) that the 
distributions of changes in many speculative price series 
were characterized by leptokurtosis (i.e., both peakedness 
and fat tails) meant that the probability of extreme events 
was greater than what would exist if security returns were 
lognormally distributed.   Put differently, even extreme price 
moves should be the result of the market’s response to 
the arrival of new fundamental information in an efficient 
capital market.
To be sure, there is a considerable literature in financial 
economics that argues that changes in speculative prices 
are the result of factors other than the arrival of new 
fundamental economic information.  These factors range 
from noise (Black, 1986) to the bid/ask bounce (Marsh and 
Rosenfeld, 1986) to positive feedback and noise trading 
(DeLong et al., 1989, 1990a, 1990a) to large orders or order 
flow (e.g., Evans and Lyons, 2002) among others.  Not 
surprisingly, apparent bubbles and crashes in speculative 
prices have spawned a large literature that seeks to 
explain them or deny their existence.   Implicit in much of 
this literature is the belief by many observers of the central 
role played by “excessive speculation.”  Of course, as Miller 
(1988) has pointed out, the term requires a benchmark 
level of speculation against which to compare it.   There is 
also a nascent literature on predatory trading that illustrates 
how the actions of some traders can exploit the problems 
of large distressed traders, thereby exacerbating a price 
move (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, Chamley, 2003 
and Corsetti et al., 2004 among others).
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2. Trading-Induced Price Changes—
Predatory Trading
Speculative prices react to news. News can consist 
of perceived fundamental information or noise--non-
fundamental information that affects prices.  Prices may 
also react to the actions of traders without news per se 
such as from large orders or positive feedback trading. 
The nature and size of trading-induced price moves are 
perhaps best illustrated through various examples.  For the 
convenience of exposition, trading-induced price moves 
will be dichotomized into those arising from predatory 
trading and those arising from flawed market microstructures.
The U.S. stock market crash of October 19, 1987 is well 
known even if the cause is still unclear.  Jackwerth and 
Rubinstein (1996) point out that the 29% decline in the S&P 
500 stock index futures price (the cash market declined less) 
was equivalent to a 27 standard deviation move assuming 
that changes in stock prices are lognormally distributed 
and annualized volatility averages 20%.  The probability 
of a 27 standard deviation move is a 10-160 event or 
virtually impossible. Regardless of whether one regards the 
crash as trading-induced or the reaction to the arrival of 
fundamental information the question arises as to whether 
it could happen again. Or, rather, did it happen again in 
the USA in 1987?  The answer is yes.  
2.1 Extreme Events: October 22, 1987
On Wednesday, October 21, 1987, the December 1987 
delivery Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index futures contract 
closed at 258.25 on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.   A 
large (5,000 contract) sell order attributed to George Soros 
whose fund was rumored to be in trouble precipitated a 
sharp selloff in S&P 500 stock index futures prices at the 
opening the next day. Suppose that you were a trader on 
the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  How would 
you react to the large sell order given the rumors of a large 
trader in trouble?  Would you buy or sell?  
The November 2, 1987 issue of Barron’s recounts the 
natural reaction of other traders:
“…The other pit traders, picking up the sound of a whale 
in trouble, hung back, but circled the prey. The offer went 
from 230 down to 220 to 215 to 205 to 200. Then, the pit 
traders attacked. The Soros block sold from 195 to 210. 
The spiral was ghastly. It was Soros’s block and not program 
trading that drove the futures to a cash discount some 50 
points, or 20%, below the cash value of the S&P contract. …” 
Keep in mind that each full point was worth $500 per 
contract at the time and that prior to the crash on Monday 
the contract usually traded in $25 increments.  The opening 
offer at 230 was $14,125 per contract below the previous 
close.  Trades at 195 (the opening and lowest price of the 
day) were $31,625 per contract lower than Wednesday’s 
closing price.  And, with interest rates exceeding 
dividend rates stock index futures prices should exceed 
corresponding cash market prices if the cost of carry model 
of futures prices is correct.  
The market had an exceptionally wide opening range 
of 195 to 202 or $3500.  Soros suffered a loss in excess of 
$200 million.  Barron’s (1987) reported: “…The discount on 
the 5,000 contracts represented some $250 million. [Soros] 
covered there, as did a number of local traders who made 
millions off the immediate snapback in price. The contract 
that day closed at 244.50, or some $222 million higher, 
based on Soros‘s position…” 
Note that the magnitude of the decline in the value of 
the S&P 500 stock index futures contract from Wednesday’s 
close to Thursday’s opening was 21.8% to 23.8%---roughly 
the same size as the decline in the cash S&P 500 stock index 
on Monday, October 19, 1987.  Note also that the effect 
of the large sell order was largely limited to the S&P 500 
stock index futures market.  Unlike Monday, October 19th, 
prices in the stock market did not fall very much so that, at 
one point, the December ’87 S&P 500 stock index futures 
contract was trading at a 50 point discount to the cash 
index.  The huge discount was a result, in part, of the inability 
to easily do index arbitrage in the wake of the crash.
2.2 Extreme Events: October 7, 1998
On Wednesday, October 7, 1998, the dollar fell sharply 
against the yen.  At one point, the dollar was down almost 12 
yen or over 9.15% intraday.  This is an incredible move for the 
exchange rate between the currencies of two developed 
economies.  The catalyst for this huge move was simply the 
unwinding of massive short yen and yen-carry positions by 
hedge funds and other market participants—and the belief 
that some major hedge funds were in trouble.
Once again, the rumor of some key traders attempting 
to unwind a large position sparked a change in the actions 
and strategies of other traders.  Tiger Management—at the 
time the largest hedge fund in the world—was rumored 
to have lost over $1 billion on that day from its short yen 
positions.
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2.3 Extreme Events: October 26, 2008
The Sunday, October 26, 2008 announcement by 
Porsche that it controlled almost three-quarters of VW 
shares directly or indirectly through stock holdings and call 
options sparked panic buying by short sellers.3 This resulted 
in a 146% rise in VW’s stock price on Monday, October 27, 
2011 and, as Xydias (2008) notes, another 93% rise intraday 
on Tuesday, October 28, 2008 to a high of €1005 per share 
or over 5 times the closing price the previous Friday. For one 
brief shining moment, in the midst of a global financial crisis 
and widespread recession, VW was the largest company 
in the world in terms of market capitalization.  Here was a 
large price move that was entirely related to one market 
participant gaming the system rather than the arrival of 
fundamental new information.
2.4 Extreme Events:  Speculative Attacks
The above events were examples of traders behaving 
in a very opportunistic fashion—(i.e., taking advantage of 
traders in distress).  There are numerous similar instances. 
But do cases exist where traders attempt to make things 
happen (i.e., create distress for market participants by 
pushing prices in a certain direction)?   The answer is yes 
and such situations arise during speculative attacks.  Webb 
(2007) reports that in 1997, some hedge funds tried to 
break the link of the HK dollar to the US dollar.  This induced 
considerable volatility in interest rates and HK equity prices. 
The volatility spilled over to the USA on October 27, 1997 
when US equity prices fell over 7%.  Notwithstanding the 
volatility in equity and fixed income prices the link of the 
Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar held as the hedge funds 
ran out of Hong Kong dollars to short.  The hedge funds 
would have made a fortune had they sold Hong Kong 
stocks before the speculative attack.  The hedge funds 
learned from their errors, borrowed HK$30 billion via a 
currency swap and tried again in 1998.  This time the hedge 
funds sold Hong Kong stock index futures in advance of 
the speculative attack on the Hong Kong dollar.  Joseph 
Yam (1998), head of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(Hong Kong’s de facto central bank) at the time states: 
“We estimate that the hedge funds involved had amassed 
in excess of HK$30 billion in currency borrowings at an 
interest cost of around HK$4 million a day.  They also held 
an estimated 80,000 short [Hang Seng stock index futures] 
contracts, which translated into the following calculation: 
for every fall of 1,000 points in the Hang Seng [stock] index 
they stood to make a profit of HK$4 billion.  ...  If they could 
have achieved it within 100 days they would have netted 
HK$3.6billlion....”  
The preceding examples demonstrate that you do not 
need electronic trading platforms and high frequency 
traders to have substantial trading-induced price changes. 
Predatory trading can precipitate large price moves.
3. Trading-Induced Price Changes—
Flawed Market Microstructures
Another source of sudden large price changes arises 
from the actions of high frequency and algorithmic traders 
in continuously open electronic markets without designated 
market makers.  Consider the following examples.
3.1 May 6, 2010 “Flash Crash.” 
On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
suddenly fell over 600 points in less than five minutes only 
to recover most of the 600-point loss within minutes.4 An 
interagency task force assigned to investigate the cause 
of the flash crash (Securities Exchange Commission (2010)) 
concluded it was caused by a fundamental trader who 
submitted an order to sell 75,000 e-mini S&P 500 stock 
index futures contracts without price or time limits. About 
6 percent of the total value of the U.S. stock market was 
wiped out in moments without any apparent reason only 
to recover shortly thereafter.  
While the flash crash in equity prices is well known fewer 
people are aware of even larger flash crashes in commodity 
markets.  Moreover, it is doubtful that any lessons learned 
from the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash were implemented as 
these lesser-known flash crashes occurred in 2011.
3.2 March 1, 2011 “Flash Crash” in Cocoa Futures
On March 1, 2011, May delivery cocoa futures fell 12.5% 
in less than a minute on the Intercontinental Commodity 
Exchange only to quickly rebound and close down 2.5% for 
the day.   Once again, the presumed culprit was a large 
sell order.
3.3 February 3, 2011 “Flash Crash” in Sugar Futures
On February 3, 2011, March delivery sugar futures prices 
suddenly plunged.  The decline in cocoa futures prices 
mentioned earlier was slow compared with the nearly 6% 
plunge in March sugar futures prices in a single second. 
The presumed source in this case was algorithmic trading.   
3.4 June 8, 2011 Natural Gas Futures Flash Crash
On June 8, 2011, July delivery New York Mercantile 
Exchange natural gas futures suddenly fell over 8% in 
after regular trading hours trading only to recover in a few 
seconds.  Algorithmic trading was blamed.
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3.5 November 25, 2011 Automated Trading Gone 
Wild
Reuters News (Spicer, 2011) reported on November 25, 
2011 that a high frequency trading firm was fined by the 
CME for losing control over their trading algorithms on 
three occasions. The firm’s “buying on February 3, [2010] 
sparked a frenzied $1 surge in oil prices late that day as the 
computer program sent thousands of orders per second, 
racking up a million-dollar loss for the firm.” Although this 
does not constitute an extreme price move it does illustrate 
the potential of uncontrolled trading algorithms to increase 
volatility in speculative prices.
3.6 Policy Responses to Automated Trading Induced 
Volatility
Bloomberg News (McCormick, 2011) reported on March 
17, 2011: “The yen soared 4.5 percent in 26 minutes as 
markets closed in New York and re-opened in Asia amid 
speculation automated trades to limit losses were taking 
place. The yen reached 76.36 per dollar before erasing 
its gains.”  The sharp rise in the yen was one factor that 
precipitated an intervention in the currency markets by G-7 
central banks.
4. Implications 
Trading induced price changes may arise from: 
predatory trading; positive feedback trading; flawed 
market microstructure or trading strategies; erroneous 
orders; large orders in illiquid markets.  These changes may 
spill over to other markets.  They may affect the actions of 
other traders and policymakers. 
4.1 Implications for Policymakers
Policymakers should make a concerted effort to harness 
the power of positive feedback trading when possible. 
Coordinated action by various central banks on November 
30, 2011 sparked a rally in equity prices around the world 
in part due to triggering short covering.  Policymakers 
need to be careful to avoid drawing incorrect inferences 
from speculative price moves.  For instance, the Federal 
Reserve’s surprise 75 basis point rate cut on January 22, 2008 
was precipitated, in part, by falling equity prices in Europe. 
As it turned out, European equity prices were falling due to 
the unwinding of Jerome Kerviel’s rogue trading positions 
by Societe Generale.5
Policymakers must address the issue of whether 
additional safeguards are needed to protect the integrity 
of speculative markets from sharp price moves unrelated 
to the arrival of fundamental information.  One dimension 
of market microstructure that should be considered is the 
frequency of trading. It is worth pointing out that the fragility 
of speculative markets to automated trading is partly a 
result of continuous markets.
4.2 Implications for Practitioners
Trading induced price changes or market microstructures 
that enhance volatility increase the risks for all market 
participants and change how they should trade and price 
securities.  The regular occurrence of “extreme events” 
means that option prices should take the possibility of their 
occurrence into account.  For instance, put options prior to 
the 1987 stock market crash were “underpriced.”
4.3 Implications for Academics
Most prices reflect the interplay of supply and demand. 
It is worth repeating.  Most prices reflect the interplay 
of supply and demand.  For good or for ill, most market 
prices reflect the consensus view of market participants 
given current and prospective economic conditions and 
sentiment.  However, mixed in with price changes driven 
by the arrival of new fundamental information or noise are 
price changes that are entirely trading induced.6
The fact that some of the largest extreme price moves 
are trading induced highlights the fact that trading is a 
game.  Not all large price changes reflect new fundamental 
information (outside of game specific issues such as 
holdings by various market participants.)  More research 
needs to be conducted on both predatory trading and 
positive feedback trading.
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